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Legislative Mandates for Energy Model Documentation and Access:
A Historical Analysis
1. Introduction
In the last decade, public access to government operations and
documents has become of increasing interest to many Americans. At least
in part growing out of the tumult of the 1960s, the desire for release of
government documents has become a trend leading in some cases to direct
confromtation between the public and the government, as with the Pentagon
Papers and the Nixon tapes. More conventional steps to increase public
scrutiny have also been taken including the Sunshine Law of 1976 [1] and
the Freedom of Information Acts [2].
Of more direct interest to the energy information community,
however, is the subset of the access issue which concerns government
access to energy industry information, and in turn, public access to
government data and data analysis tools, notably computer models. Since
the oil embargo of 1973, the U.S. government has tried to develop systems
to accommodate increasing numbers of requests for access to energy
information; the creation of various departments within the government to
coordinate, maintain, and publish energy information was a first obvious
action.
However, the definition of access itself, and appropriate means of
supplying that access, are still at issue, and affected agencies (in
particular the Energy Information Administration of the Department of
Energy) are presently engaged in the process of determining how public
access to energy models might best be established.
While the extent to which analytical models become fully accessible
to the public will no doubt depend to some degree on the cost and ease of
2implementation of proposed methods, a policy context for access
procedures can be developed by examining pertinent existing legislation
and its intent. Pragmatic access practices can then be designed to fall
within the scope of that context. As a means of providing such a
framework, and in order to understand more clearly the processes that
have led to current model assessment and access activities, this paper
will first examine the general set of issues and concerns that led to
legislative efforts, and then will turn its attention to specific actions
taken by Congress to address those concerns.
2. Issues and Concerns
A survey of the Congressional energy literature produced during the
1970s (including legislation, committee reports and prints, hearings
proceedings, and testimony) has indicated that concern during the decade
over energy information was widespread among sectors of the public, and
was comprehensive in nature. Not only was government use of energy
information at issue, but the data itself was considered suspect. In
general, concerns about the energy information fell into four categories:
1) concerns over the credibility of available data,
2) concerns over the analysis of that data,
3) concerns about the appropriateness of policy responses to the
analysis, and
4) concerns about computer modeling.
The integrity of governmental and corporate dealings was not a new issue
when it surfaced with the energy crisis; in fact, it has been a theme
throughout the development of the American system of democracy. The
original three-tiered format of the government, the popular electing of
3officials, and the antitrust legislation of the turn of the century all
were aimed at reducing concentration of power, and maintaining
accountability and accessibility of the nations's decision makers.
However, during the last decade the issue of accountability arose in a
new context. The highly visible profits of the oil companies during a
time of energy shortage and the government's use of increasingly complex
analytical tools tended to focus attention on concerns about the basis,
form, and impact of energy information and policy. In the following
sections four substantive components of that concern will be examined in
more detail.
2.1 Credibility of Energy Data
During the early 1970s there was much discontent over the adequacy
of the data upon which U.S. energy policy was ostensibly based. A review
of various Congressional hearings held from 1973 to 1977 [22-27] has
indicated that this concern had several aspects, summarized as follows:
o Companies (energy producers) were withholding too much
information, classifying it as proprietary, and thereby limiting
the data with which the government could work.
o The data that the government did have was largely supplied by the
energy industry, thereby biasing the data base in favor of
industry interests.
o There was a lack of independent verification of industry-supplied
data.
o It was impossible to compare the data bases of different agencies
because of differences in definitions of the same technical terms
(such as "proven resources") and variations in measurement and
quantification techniques.
o Gaps existed in the data, and conflicting statistics were
reported at the same time by different agencies (such as the
Bureau of Mines and the U.S. Geological Survey).
4These complaints addressed the actual condition of the data base upon
which any analysis was dependent. Therefore, the development of a
complete, accurate, and orderly data base was of the first order of
importance.
Specific examples of this kind of concern are extremely numerous,
particularly in the wake of the Arab oil embargo of 1973. As Senator
John Glenn [22] has pointed out, it was generally recognized that at the
time of the embargo no one in the U.S. government was able to accurately
state the amount of reserves of oil and gasoline in the United States.
Indeed, reports were widespread that reserves of gasoline during the
shortage were 5 percent higher than normal, as were rumors that tankers
full of petroleum were forced to wait off the coast of the United States
because there were no storage facilities available at which they could
offload their cargo. The General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1976 [26]
agreed that much of the rampant public skepticism about government energy
pronouncements could be traced to the oil embargo. Although four
government agencies undertook studies of reserves at that time, the
credibility problem was not resolved when those studies were published,
even though, according to GAO, most aggregate figures did not differ from
those produced by the energy industry by more than about 10 percent. The
reason for this lack of credibility was the fact that the reports could
not be compared to one another due to disparaties in the format of the
data bases.
Public interest groups, such as the Public Citizens Congressional
Watch and the Environmental Policy Center, echoed these concerns [22],
particularly as they reflected on the large extent of government reliance
on industry-supplied data, and the need for more disclosure of corporate
5information. For example, Ken Bossong, of the Center for Science in the
Public Interest stated the following at hearings held in 1976:
"[Due to] excessive reliance upon energy data supplied by the
Nation's oil, coal, natural gas and electric utilities industries,
FEA's policies and analyses have . . . paralleled to a very large
degree the views of the companies which the agency is supposed to be
watch-dogging [23]."
One theme, then, was for full disclosure of private industry's data, a
theme strongly opposed by most companies and many legislators. The
argument for disclosure, however, found a strong advocate in Senator
Abourezk of South Dakota [25]. While some witnesses at government
hearings argued that more complete disclosure of private sector
information would not hurt any individual corporation as long as all
companies were subjected to the same regulations, Senator Abourezk took a
more extreme approach. It was his feeling that the federal government
and the energy producers had together "rigged" the energy shortage in
order to increase the prices of gas and oil. This distrust led him to
argue that all industry information should become public unless the
company could prove the need for confidentiality. The companies, not
surprisingly, took the opposite stance--that the burden of proving the
need for the information rested on the public sector.*
Proponents of disclosure of industry information also pointed to the
movement of employees between the large corporations, and interlocking
directorates. They asked how companies could claim that proprietary
information was being kept "secret" from competitors, when a given
*Senator Abourezk claimed that a precedent supporting his viewpoint
had been set in what he called the "landmark decision" of February 4,
1974, in which the Federal Power Commission won the point that ". . . the
public right to the information outweighs the private proprietary
interest" of the energy producers [25]. Others at these hearings
supported this viewpoint, including Senator Gaylord Nelson, and Ralph
Nader.
6individual might be sitting on the Boards of Directors of two or more
major oil companies simultaneously [25]. While industry representatives
and some legislators (including Senators Bartlett and Fannin [22]) argued
for proprietary protection, Congressional actions subsequently indicated
the general support for greater disclosure of industry data in order to
improve the government data base.
2.2 Analysis of Energy Data
A second major set of issues revolved around the analysis of
available data. The problem of analysis was in some ways of graver
concern than that of insufficient information, because inadequacies of
analysis were considered more difficult to detect than inadequacies of
data.
In general, critical opinions about government analysis of energy
data were grouped as follows:
o the analysts were too closely related to the oil industry to
prepare truly independent and objective reports;
o the analysts were under pressure from the Executive Branch to
develop data that would support particular policy positions; and
o the assumptions and interpretations that went into the analyses
were not distinguishable from the factual bases and were not
identified, making replication of results difficult.
In essence, many people wished to insulate analysis activities from
outside influences that might deter objectivity. They also demanded
better documentation of what analytical assumptions had been made, in
order to facilitate review and alteration of important inputs.
For example, one complaint was that the government's energy analysts
had been "groomed" by the private energy industry prior to joining the
public sector, and thus would be biased toward industry viewpoints.
7While trading of experts between public and private sectors is not
uncommon, and can be a positive influence in many ways, the energy debate
was highly sensitive to suggestions of bias. (Indeed, this viewpoint
still persists as a recent study produced by Common Cause, listing
important energy officials and their past employment affiliations,
indicates [37].)
Thus, insulation from industry pressure was a concern. However, an
equally strident demand was for insulation from Administrative pressure.
Ken Bossong described succinctly what many witnesses at Congressional
hearings were indicating about the need for this kind of insulation [23]:
"The responsibility for collecting and analyzing the information
upon which FEA bases its pricing decisions should be vested
elsewhere. Currently FEA is a captured agency of the White House
and its interpretation of given data reflects both the biases of the
Administration as well as the priorities of the industries that
supply the data. We believe that information gathering and analysis
should be located in a separate agency--possibly one located within
Congress."
The desire was to assure the nation of accurate basic data on which to
base its energy decisions. In order to do this effectively, that data
had to be "as independent of political influence as humanly possible
[22]."
In February of 1974, William Simon, then the Administrator of the
Federal Energy Office, wrote the following in a letter to Senator Gaylord
Nelson of the Senate Interior Committee:
"As I indicated in my testimony before your committee, there is an
urgent need for a strong and objective Energy Information Center.
This office must have the authority to collect a wide range of data
including reserves, inventories, production, consumption, cost,
pricing, and other energy related information. Legislation is
needed to establish the Energy Information Center in the Federal
Energy Administration upon passage of its enabling legislation, and
to temporarily staff and manage the Center in the FEA
Independence and objectivity of the Office would be a high priority
and would be assured by the release to the public of as much
information as possible and the establishment of an independent
review group to oversee the office's operations [25]."
8This kind of strong statement of assurance was specifically intended to
quell the fears of non-objectivity in data analysis that had been voiced
on nearly every front. However, to many people, merely having a stated
assurance was not enough. Ralph Nader, for example, coined the term
"simonizing" to describe his opinion of William Simon's ability to
sidestep any direct attempt by Congress to force disclosure of
information [25]. In fact, two years later, in 1976, criticisms similar
to those discussed above were still being voiced. While the organization
for handling energy data was better established by then, the analytical
results were subject to the same attacks on credibility. Therefore, it
was the attitude of many that openness had to be legislated and that
relying on Administration assurances was no longer sufficient.*
In early 1976 the GAO made a series of suggestions to Congress about
the ways in which the energy data collection and analysis functions could
be insulated from policy functions [23]. Some of these included:
o "Do not provide the data agency with any regulatory or policy
functions.
o "Stipulate by specific legislative provisions the
responsibilities of the energy data agency emphasizing its
independence, objectivity, and credibility as a source of energy
data. In this regard, provide through legislative history the
intent of the Congress that the head of the data agency
independently speak of all matters relative to energy data,
including testimony before the Congress.
*A clear instance of fears about Executive Branch pressure on the
Energy Information Office can be seen in the discredit to which the Ford
stripmining veto was subjected in 1975 [22]. Investigative reporters and
other concerned citizens charged that the facts on which President Ford
based his controversial veto were either fabricated or "massaged" to fit
the case; indeed, they claimed that some of the facts had been produced
after the veto, in order to support and legitimize the decision. Whether
or not these charges were substantiated, the fear that analysis was being
altered in order to fit Administration policy goals was an extremely
strong one.
9o "Provide for close Congressional monitoring and oversight of the
data agency's activities, including calling for the exercise of
GAO's new responsibilities under the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act to verify energy data."
The suggestion was that these objectives should be accomplished through
statutory or other legislated provision.
While the fear of data manipulation might have been strong in any
statistical setting, it was made even stronger due to the use of complex
integrated modeling techniques, such as those used in the 1974 Project
Independence Evaluation System (PIES). In dealing with this issue, Senator
Floyd Haskell in 1976 [22] called for both internal (i.e. governmental) and
external (i.e. institutional, university) model assessment activities. His
argument was that if it is true that the use of different models containing
differing methodologies and assumptions leads to different conclusions
about the impacts of energy policy actions, then it is the assumptions and
methodologies which need to be understood most clearly.*
*In fact, he recommended comparing the results of several modeling
techniques focused on the same issue in order to identify congruences,
rather than differences. If similar forecasts existed in spite of
methodological variations, then the given results might be construed to be
more accurate. In Senator Haskell's words: "If uniformity in certain types
of energy information will facilitate the policy process, in other areas we
should be seeking the diversity which arises from a number of independent
assessments of information. The role of the federal government should be
both that of an analyzer and a provider of basic data. The sophisticated
calculations and models which use basic energy information to compute the
consequences or impacts of policy options should be carried out in several
independent and technically qualified centers of expertise. This may lead
to differing estimates of the economic impact of energy policies or to
differing estimates of domestic energy reserves, because different
assumptions and methodologies are employed. In this case we should discuss
those assumptions and methodologies explicitly and learn from the
differences. It may be that we can truly evaluate assessments of this sort
only by looking for a convergence of a number of independent estimates.
Where judgment is involved in dealing with energy information, the federal
government should make the basic data available and encourage independent
efforts to analyze this information. The creation of an institution and the
procedures to open up access to energy information is a primary goal of the
Energy Information Act and my amendment to it [22]."
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2.3 Issues in Energy Policy
A third major component of the dissatisfaction surrounding the
government's handling of energy information and data concerned policy
ostensibly developed on the basis of the analysis of government energy
information. While debates on the appropriateness or desirability of any
particular course of action are the essence of policy formulation, the
character of this particular debate was somewhat different, since not only
the substance but the underpinnings of the policies were being challenged.
The major points were the following:
o As in the analytical process, there was a fear that the energy
industry was dictating the policies that were to be enacted, and
that the Administration was implementing those policies
regardless of the results of its own analyses;
o there was a great deal of dissatisfaction about lack of
consideration of the impact of policy on the consumer, and lack
of consumer and citizen participation in general in the policy
formation process; and
o there was an apparent conflict inherent in the fact that the FEA
in 1976 was in a sense promoting the same industry that it was
supposed to be regulating.
Again, specific instances of these charges are numerous. For example,
there is evidence in the literature that at least some Americans felt that
government and big business were conspiring together to implement programs
that would not necessarily be of benefit to the general public.* Others
*Martin Lobel of the Citizens' Energy Platform said the following [28]:
".. Most energy planning is still being done by the major oil companies
behind closed doors with the administration. Public access to decisionmakers
and public involvement in decisionmaking has been a big PR confidence game.
There was a lot of hoopla about public hearings around the country on Project
Independence, yet, the plan was released before the transcripts of most of
these hearings could even reach Washington, let alone be considered by the FEA
or the White House. The same was not true with the major oil company input--
that was ready and welcomed. The FEA has admitted that it conferred privately
with the American Petroleum Institute before sending out a congressionally
mandated questionnaire on domestic oil reserves and had deleted 11 questions
at the API's suggestion. No public input was sought in designing this form
and not surprisingly the deletions made at the API's "suggestion" eliminated
almost all the relevant data."
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were more concerned about the consumer per se, and the general lack of
public involvement. Ken Bossong, for example, of the Center for Science
in the Public Interest, maintained that even legislated consumer mandates
present in the FEA Act of 1974 were being ignored by the Administration
in its energy deliberations [23].* Again, this trend was viewed as a
deficiency not in the analysis of the data itself, but in the policy
formation process based on that analysis.
The third point of contention, concerning conflicting roles being
carried out within a single agency, found proponents in at least three
senators in 1976--Percy, Leahy and Chiles. These gentlemen argued at
Congressional hearings [23] that the FEA promoted the same industry that
it regulated. Their feeling was that if the role of the FEA was to
represent oil interests, and they thought it was, then that same agency
couldn't possibly be expected to regulate the industry in a just manner.
There was also a perceived conflict between FEA's role as a promoter of
*Ken Bossong: "While possessing an extensive public information
office operation, FEA has consistently failed to alert the public to
pending policy decisions early enough to give the public an opportunity
to participate in their formulation. The opportunities for public
participation have only come in the final stages of decisionmaking such
as the statutorily mandated proforma public hearings and Federal Register
comments. It has proven to be virtually impossible for the public to
have any impact upon FEA's energy planning when the public input is so
restricted.
This very limited participation is best reflected in the consumer
impact analyses which section 18(a) of the FEA Act clearly specifies must
accompany all major FEA regulatory and other actions. In the 2 years
since FEA has been in existence, the agency has never prepared a
satisfactory consumer impact analysis. This absence can perhaps be best
seen in the FEA's 1974 "Project Independence" and the 1976 "National
Energy Outlook" reports as well as in its entitlements program and its
many oil-pricing decisions including the most recent residual fuel oil
decontrol action. In spite of repeated requests from individuals,
national and local consumer groups, and its own Consumer Affairs Special
Impacts Advisory Committee, the FEA has consistently neglected to provide
satisfactory consumer impact studies [23]."
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deregulation and its responsibility for the legislative continuation of
price controls. Any policy which that agency proposed, and indeed any
analyses which it produced, were suspect, in view of the conflicting jobs
that it was expected to perform.*
2.4 Concerns About Computer Modeling
One further issue concerned the role of analytical models in
government energy planning. In its 1977 Annual Report the Energy
Information Administration defined modeling as "organizing available
information, guided by informed judgment, to provide insights [11]." In
EIA's view, modeling fills the gap that occurs between data collection
and validation on the one hand, and forecasting and analysis on the
other. The key to the difficulty of accepting modeling as an objective,
scientific means of decision making lies in the terms "judgement" and
"insight." In his book Energy Planning and Policy [29] Tom Teitenberg
argues that it is precisely because of the need for judgement and insight
in the forecasting of energy trends that tension and distrust exist
between decision makers (i.e. the members of Congress and the public) and
modelers (in this instance, FEA, now EIA). Any time a modeler makes an
analytical assumption, or makes a judgement about treatment of variables,
a decisionmaker's opportunity to make a choice is reduced. Since
judgement has been the traditional sphere of the decision maker, it is
Teitenberg's theory that even with other issues more or less resolved,
tension will exist between these participants.
*As Joseph Fisher, of Resources for the Future put it, "Agencies
charged with complicated and difficult and sensitive responsibilities,
like rationing, or allocation or price controls, simply don't do well at
objective, careful, balanced appraisal of what is going on [25]."
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The review of the literature indicates that some such concerns may
indeed have existed, particularly when PIES was first released. As the
computer modeling systems became more complex, and were thus readily
comprehensible to fewer and only more highly trained people, the nature
of the analytical process became more remote from the public's
understanding. This, coupled with fears about Administration or industry
tampering, led to a feeling that biases in computer models might be too
deeply obscured to be detected. The models, purporting to be objective
and factual, might not in fact be so.
This is not to imply however, that all comments concerning models
were critical. For example PIES was widely praised as a good first
attempt, even while flaws were noted. In its 1976 review of the model
GAO stated [9]:
"GAO believes that the 1974 Project Independence Evaluation is a
valuable attempt to provide an integrated framework for evaluating
energy policy. Under severe time constraints, the Federal Energy
Administration developed an innovative framework for analyzing the
complex and interdependent sectors of the U.S. energy system."
While GAO noted many problems with the system, they felt that FEA was
aware of the limitations of PIES and was working toward improvements.
However, GAO also stated that they felt FEA "should give highest priority
. to development of complete documentation for the system [9]."
Reviewers from the MIT Energy Laboratory and from the Battelle Columbus
Laboratories cited PIES as a "critical step" in the creation of an
adequate information base [13] and as "a point of departure for. .
promoting a more rational and less wasteful approach . . . to energy
resources" [38]; other scholarly evaluations of the system contained
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similar statements.* While these comments reflect a positive attitude
towards the potential role of modeling activities in energy policy
formation, they also show support for serious efforts toward improved and
documented systems, and credible results.
We have seen, therefore, that the entire process of energy data
collection and analysis was subject to criticism and skepticism during
the mid-70s, not only because of suspicion of Administration intent and
industry lobbying, but also because of fundamental weaknesses in the
composition of the data base proper. However, one issue on which there
was literally no disagreement was the general need for better energy data
organization and manipulation. According to a GAO statement made in
1976, there were 261 separate energy-related programs being administered
by 44 federal agencies and bureaus [26]. The FEA, ERDA, NSF and Bureau
of the Census accounted for one-third of those, with the federal
government operating 98 separate computerized data bases containing
energy-related information. This was clearly too fragmented, and
undoubtedly led to duplication and an increased reporting burden on
companies. Again it is important to note that this was not an argument
against the concept of computer modeling. Rather, the purpose of the
process was to look for ways to improve the modeling capabilities of the
government, first by better in-house methodology, and second by
*A reviewer from the University of New Mexico indicated that "the
progress which the FEA has made in refining the PIES since the Project
Indepence Report gives every reason for optimism in terms of the
potential of their approach in serving as a useful tool for analyzing
policy options for the United States in its efforts to deal with an
uncertain energy future [14]."
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constructive evaluation efforts.* In the following section the
legislative initiatives to achieve these objectives will be considered.
3. Legislation Concerning Energy Information
3.1 Early Efforts
Congress, through a series of energy bills, asked the energy
agencies in the federal government to implement a strategy for public
access and model assessment which had never been tried before. In
response, the government has been grappling in an increasingly direct way
with achieving public access to energy information and analytical tools.
Below, the steps in this legislative process are examined.
In April of 1973, Senator Jackson of the influential Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs asked the GAO to perform a
feasibility study on the formation of an energy data bank which would
study both supply and demand of various energy resources [25]. Jackson
wanted this data bank to be subject to an independent input and
verification process, and asked if it could profitably be placed in the
Executive Branch of the government. The GAO's study, which came out
early the next spring concluded that such an energy bank would be
feasible within the Executive Branch, but would need to be established
through a legislative procedure. Moreover, GAO indicated that it would
probably take several years to develop the bank to the point of real
competence [25].
*Laurence Moss of the FEA Environmental Advisory Committee testified
that his aim was to see more ambitious modeling efforts undertaken as a
means of improving the basis for decision making in the U.S. [23].
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Concurrently, in the spring of 1973, the Executive Branch was
considering the energy information problem. Dismantling the Office of
Emergency Preparedness, President Nixon established by Executive Order a
National Energy Office within the Executive Office of the President. In
addition, an Office of Energy Data and Analysis was established as a part
of the Department of the Interior, in response to a 1973 Nixon "energy
message."
In October of 1973, as a result of the Egyptian-Israeli war in the
Mid-East, the Arab nations imposed an embargo on oil exported to the
United States and other nations supporting Israel. The embargo ended in
March, but the associated higher prices remained in force, bringing the
nation's dependency on foreign oil into virtually every American's
conscious awareness. In November of 1973, while the embargo was in full
swing, President Nixon galvanized his energy staff into action with a
highly publicized speech proclaiming as a goal the energy "independence"
of the United States by the year 1980. In addition, he issued an
Executive Order that established the Federal Energy Office (FEO) within
the Office of the President as an interim measure pending the
implementation of the Federal Energy Administration Act by Congress [25].
This legislation [4], signed in May of 1974, consolidated the energy
information offices, moving the FEO and the Office of Energy Data and
Analysis to the new FEA.
The FEA Act made a start at addressing some of the access and
information concerns which were discussed above, though not to the extent
of later laws. In the "Functions and Purposes" section of the Act,
mention is made of involving state and local governments, as well as
business, labor, and consumer interests, in the work of the
17
Administration. Another section details the GAO's role in monitoring all
activities of the FEA. Finally, Section 14 (a) reads as follows: "The
Administrator shall make public, on a continuing basis, any statistical
and economic analyses, data, information, and whatever reports and
summaries are necessary to keep the public fully and currently informed
as to the nature, extent, and projected duration of shortages of energy
supplies, the impact of such shortages, and the steps being taken to
minimize such impacts [4]." Other language regarded release of industry
data and the participation of advisory committees in FEA operations. One
month later, in June of 1974, the Energy Supply and Environmental
Coordination Act [5] was signed, which essentially strengthened the
enforcement of reporting requirements to the FEA by energy producers and
users.
However, while these bills were first steps towards better
information collection and dissemination, their provisions did not really
address the complicated access issues which became evident with the
publication of the Project Independence Report in November of 1974 [18].
This report summarized the results of the computer modeling effort which
had been undertaken by the President's energy staff in the previous six
months, an unprecedented effort in terms of scope and complexity. While
nearly all reviewers agreed that the system, and indeed modeling and
forecasting in general, were important to the understanding of
energy/economic trends in the U.S., dissatisfaction with the extent to
which assumptions could be identified and the extent to which the entire
process was documented, was also widespread (see reviews by GAO [9],
M.I.T. [13], Battelle [38]). Thus the general fears of Administration
manipulation of data for policy goals, and the other concerns discussed
above, were perhaps heightened rather than alleviated by the PIES report.
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The energy information issue continued to be debated and many
energy-related bills were submitted, considered, and enacted throughout
the next two years. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 [6]
further strengthened the FEA's information-gathering capabilities, and
authorized GAO accounting audits into energy-related corporate finances.
In addition, in December of 1975 an Interagency Council on Energy
Information was formed, with representatives from FEA, the Federal Power
Commission, the Department of the Interior, the Energy Research and
Development Administration, GAO, and the Office of Management and
Budget. The purpose of this council was to provide for better
coordination and quality of energy information gathering activities, and
it had three basic tasks [26]:
1) to standardize the terminology and classification used by various
energy parties in order to allow for study results to be more
easily compared;
2) to register all energy data collected in order to identify and
eliminate duplication of effort; and
3) to analyze future requirements for information--that is, to
identify gaps in the existing data network.
3.2 The Energy Conservation and Production Act
However, the most direct tool for providing access not only to
government and industry data and reports, but also to the methodology and
analysis behind those reports, was provided in the Energy Conservation
and Production Act of 1976 [7]. This piece of legislation addressed
itself directly to the problems posed by computer modeling and to
increased access in general. It did this by means of two major
amendments to the FEA Act of 1974, the first concerning PIES and the
second establishing an Office of Energy Information and Analysis.
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The first amendment, which dealt with PIES, was an addition provided
by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. It contained
three major provisions:
1) that all structural, parametric and operational documentation of
the model must be submitted to Congress;
2) that representatives of Congressional committees must be provided
with access to the model; and
3) that members of the public be permitted access to the model on
the FEA computer system, on reasonable terms.
The reasoning behind such unprecedented language can be found in the
Committee's report on the bill [34]. As the excerpt below taken from
that report indicates, the Committee's concern was that public access to
the model should be as broad as possible. Because the intent of this
legislation is as critical to further interpretation of access
requirements as the letter of the law itself, this section of the
Committee report is reproduced below in full.
"The Office of Energy Policy and Analysis has been assigned
principal responsibilities for the development of the Project
Independence Evaluation System (PIES) computer model. This model
has played a major role in the evolution of the policies of the
Federal Energy Administration and, indeed, of the Congress in
dealing with the energy problems which confront us. The Committee
is persuaded that such an analytical tool can indeed serve a highly
useful purpose, but is concerned that the model should be given
searching and independent review and that it should be made
accessible to all segments of the public which desire access to it.
The Committee has recently contracted for the services of a group of
independent consultants to prepare an evaluation and review of the
PIES model. This evaluation will be made available to the Congress,
and hearings will be held on this matter after this evaluation is
completed this summer.
In keeping with a perceived need for public access, the Committee
wrote into the legislation a specific requirement that the
Administrator provide full descriptive documentation of the computer
model by September 1 of this year and operating documentation by
January 1, 1977. This was required not only because such
documentation is necessary in order to allow independent access to
the model, but also because the Committee is aware that a number of
individuals involved in the construction of this model may soon
leave, making it difficult for their successors to accurately
understand and operate the model.
20
The Committee also required the Administrator to provide ready
access to the PIES model to representatives of Congressional
Committees. While the costs of any such access must be borne by the
Administration, it is believed that open access to Members and to
duly accredited employees of Congressional committees will not
result in extensive additional costs or burdens. If the Committee's
expectations in this regard prove ill-founded, the Committee is
prepared to consider remedial legislation.
The Committee also concluded that it would be appropriate and
desirable for the Administration to make its model accessible to
members of the public as well, but wishes to make it clear that any
such access would be conditioned upon proper terms and conditions
imposed by the Administration to insure that its other official
functions are not impeded. Costs of such access, including both
computer time and costs of providing staff to assist members of the
public using the model, would be borne entirely by those obtaining
access.
Some concern was expressed that this broadened public access to
the PIES model might in some manner encourage access by unauthorized
persons to proprietary information. While it is true that FEA does
have access to such information, the legislation requires only that
the model itself be accessible to the public--not that the data base
which the model was established to deal with should be accessible.
The Committee intends that the confidentiality of any such
information will not be endangered by this legislation.
It is the purpose of the Committee in adopting these additional
constraints to insure that the model is given thorough and adequate
public review. The Committee notes the intention of the
Administration continually to update the model and annually to
update its National Energy Outlook. We commend this activity as a
useful and, indeed, essential element in the effort to maintain the
utility of this model as an element in the development of a national
energy policy. It is the Committee's expectation that the annual
reviews and revision of the model will be conducted openly and that
members of the public will be provided an opportunity to review
decisions which lead to changes in the model structure, assumptions
and scenarios tested. The Committee is reluctant to write specific,
rigid, technical and procedural requirements since it is very much
aware that excessive rigidity may inhibit efficient and timely
results. The Committee does, however, expect the Administration to
make every effort to insure that this process continues in an open
manner [34]."
Thus the Committee's concerns revolved around independent review of the
model, future usablilty of the analytical tools, and broad public access
to the model in general. This interpretation of the access issue was
also referred to in a 1978 report prepared by the Logistics Management
Institute (LMI) for DOE, which concluded after talking with staff members
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of the same House Committee that drafted the ECPA Amendment that the
broadest interpretation of access was to be implied by the legislation
[2].
The second major set of amendments contained in the ECPA established
the Office of Energy Information and Analysis (OEI&A), which was
subsequently to be named the Energy Information Administration (EIA).
This amendment was not a part of the bill as it went to the committees,
but instead was added from the Senate floor by Senator Floyd Haskell.
While it was adopted by the narrow margin of only one vote (46-45), the
amendment was retained by the Conference Committee, who stated the
following:
"The purpose of the Office of Energy Information and Analysis
amendments is to insulate the energy data-gathering and analysis
functions of the FEA from the policy making responsibilities of the
agency [33]."
The purpose as contained within the Act itself was to "assure the
availability of adequate, comparable, accurate, and credible energy
information to the FEA, to other government agencies responsible for
energy-related policy decisions, to the Congress, and to the public." To
quote Senator Haskell from an earlier attempt to set up such an
administration:
"Where judgement is involved in dealing with energy information, the
Federal government should make the basic data available and
encourage independent efforts to analyze this information. The
creation of an institution and the procedures to open up access to
energy information is a primary goal. . . [22]"
Thus, both credibility and accessibility were priority concerns.
The most important sections creating the OEI&A established a
comprehensive Energy Information System, guaranteed that this Office
would have sophisticated analytical capabilities, coordinated energy
information collection activities, provided for adequate documentation
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for all reports prepared including validation audits, provided for
Congressional access to all energy information in the possession of the
Office, and finally, called for outside review of the procedures and
methodology employed by the OEI&A [7]. This review was to be
accomplished by a Professional Audit Review Team (PART) composed of
members of other Federal agencies and chaired by the GAO. The mandate of
PART was to investigate all aspects of the Office's performance and
activities and to report once annually to the President and to Congress.
The PART review function is still intact at this time, and two such
annual reports have been produced.
It is evident that the Haskell amendment, and thus the EPCA of 1976,
was a sweeping attempt to address many of the concerns discussed above,
including adequacy of the energy information data base, credibility of
the analytical functions of the agency, insulation from policymaking
activities, and thorough review and oversight by other agencies and by
the public. A question exists about whether access to the agency's
information was not already guaranteed by the Freedom of Information Act
of 1966 and its amendments, but an examination of this subject by LMI led
them to the following conclusions:
"Even without an EPCA, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) would
enable the public to obtain much of the PIES information that they
might require. Nonetheless, the EPCA does enlarge the public's
rights to such information and services beyond what they might have
obtained under the FOIA." [21].
3.3 The DOE Organization Act and Recent Events
In spite of specific legislative protection for access and review,
criticisms of the federal government's energy information organization
were not quelled. In August of 1977 the entire organizational structure
of energy administration was changed with the passage of the Department
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of Energy Organization Act (DOE Act) [8]. This legislation, which
received strong support from both houses of Congress, created a new,
Cabinet-level Department of Energy in which the Admsinistration's energy
affairs would be consolidated. According to a Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs report of May 1977, in which the DOE bill was
reported favorably [32], over 100 separate energy data programs were to
be folded into the new DOE. While many considerations other than those
related to data and information were present in this report, the
Committee did concern itself with the need for better data organization.
For example, the report claimed that the FEA, ERDA, and the Department of
Interior had published conflicting reports, interpretations, and
forecasts concerning the nation's energy situation. At hearings
accompanying the proposed legislation [39], similar refrains were heard:
dissatisfaction with fragmentation of data collection efforts;
non-usability of information; lack of public participation in energy
decisions; lack of access to PIES and other information; and a need for
more public accountability.
The Senate Committee Report, however, emphasized that it intended to
ameliorate these difficulties in the new department. The report stressed
insulation of the new Energy Information Administration (EIA) from policy
affairs, production of independently verified data, and credible
reports. For example: "The Committee strongly endorses this separation
and wishes to explicitly incorporate in DOE those provisions which
require that the independence of data gathering and analysis from policy
formulation be reflected in the organization of the Department [32]."
The House Committee on Government Operations addressed the access issue
more directly in their report [30] on the DOE Act:
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"One of the most pervasive problems which various citizens
groups have seen with the energy situation has been their inability
to obtain accurate energy information: . . .H.R. 6804 establishes as
one of its purposes encouraging public participation in the
development and enforcement of a national energy program. To assist
in achieving this purpose, the Energy Information Administration was
established to independently collect, analyze and disseminate energy
information. In performing these functions, the Administrator of
the Energy Information Administration is not subject to the
supervision of any officer or employee of the Department of Energy.
This administration should provide the public with pertinent energy
information."
Finally, the Conference Committee, whose final version of the DOE
bill was accepted overwhelmingly by Congress (353-27 in the House; 76-14
in the Senate), also emphasized in their report [31] that the new EIA
would specifically be expected to accept all responsibility for public
access and review which had been required by the EPCA of 1976. While the
DOE Act consolidated many activities, the EIA was to remain as
independent as possible, and to remain as open to the public as existing
disclosure laws would allow.
In August of 1977 the DOE bill became law. In December of that same
year the first annual PART review was published [3]. PART had been in
existence nine months at that time, and was only considering OEI&A's
performance through October of 1977. Therefore it was not surprising
that the report contained many of the same complaints that had been
voiced previously, and stated that little progress had been made by OEI&A
in meeting legislated requirements. Specifics cited included questions
about accuracy of data, adequacy of verification, credibility, insulation
from policy making, and lack of model documentation. The latter point
was considered critical, since documentation of model assumptions and
methodology is a key factor in model access. PART stated that access to
PIES was blocked due to changes in assumptions without adequate notation
of the facts, and they concluded the following:
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"OEIA's credibility was adversely affected by a failure to make
available to the public the results of all its forecasts and the
source and rationale for the assumptions upon which the changes to
the model were based. Moreover, OEIA failed to insure the integrity
of the model by not obtaining the views of modeling and energy
experts outside of FEA regarding the model's assumptions and the
appropriateness of the changes [3]."
In the ensuing two years, much time and money has been spent
considering the access issue, both within and outside of government.
While recent energy legislation has not addressed access to energy models
directly, the ongoing use of models as tools for formulating energy
policy has led to increased attention to issues of model development and
credibility, documentation, and assessment. For example, the Energy
Information Administraton has contracted the Argonne National
Laboratory's National Energy Software Center to archive PIES and other
energy models, as a means of making them available for public use. In
addition, EIA transferred PIES (now called MEFS) to the Texas Energy and
Natural Resources Advisory Council, and has issued internal interim
documentation standards for EIA-sponsored efforts. The very broad
interpretation of "access" which Congress intended has challenged the
modeling community, and concerns over data, analysis, policy, and
modeling have not yet been totally satisfied. However, objectives of
credible energy information are being pursued, and will undoubtedly
continue to be so in the future. For example, the second annual PART
review [40] concluded,
PART believes that EIA operated independent of the energy
policy function, that it was organized and managed in a more
professional manner than its predecessor. . . Moreover, recent
actions . . . indicate that EIA is making progress toward improving
the quality and reliability of Federal energy data and analysis
activities. However, these are only the first steps and much more
needs to be done before EIA fulfills its Congressionally mandated
charter as the principal source of adequate, accurate, comparable,
and coordinated energy information within the Government."

27
RE FERENCES
1. United States Congress, Public Law 94-409, September 13, 1976.
2. United States Congress, Public Law 89-487, July 4, 1966.
3. "Activities of the Office of Energy Information and Analysis, FEA,"
Report to the President and Congress, Professional Audit Review
Team, Washington, DC, December 5, 1977.
4. United States Congress, Federal Energy Administration Act, Public
Law 93-275, May 1974.
5. United States Congress, Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination
Act, Public Law 93-319, June 1974.
6. United States Congress, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Public
Law 94-163, December 17, 1975.
7. United States Congress, Energy Conservation and Production Act,
Public Law 94-385, August 14, 1976.
8. United States Congress, Department of Energy Organization Act,
Public Law 95-91, August 4, 1977.
9. "Review of the 1974 Project Independence Evaluation System, FEA,
Report to the Congress," Comptroller General of the United States,
OPA 76-20.
10. The National Energy Plan, Executive Office of the President, Energy
Policy and Planning, April 29, 1977.
11. Annual Report to Congress, Energy Information Administration, U.S.
Department of Energy, Volume II, 1977, DOE/EIA-0036-2.
12. "Guidelines for Model Evaluation, Exposure Draft," U.S. General
Accounting Office, PAD-79-17, January 1979.
13. "The FEA Project Independence Report: An Analytical Review and
Evaluation," MIT Energy Laboratory Policy Study Group, MIT-EL
75-017, May 1975.
14. "Review of Federal Energy Administration National Energy Outlook
1976," Hans H. Landsberg, editor, Resources for the Future,
Washington, DC, March 1977. A report to the National Science
Foundation under Proposal No. 7680248.
15. "A Study for Assessing Ways to Improve the Utility of Large-Scale
Models, Final Report," Control Analysis Corporation, Palo Alto,
California, December 1978.
16. "Independent Assessment of Energy Policy Models: Two Case Studies,"
The MIT Model Assessment Group, " EL-78-011, Cambridge, MA, May 1978.
28
17. "Comnputer Model Documentation: A Review and Approach," National
Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, NBS Special
Publication 500-39, February 1979.
18. Project Independence Report, Federal Energy Administration, November
1978.
19. National Energy Outlook, Federal Energy Administration,
FEA-N-75/713, February 1976.
20. "Management and Implementation of PIES Access," Michael L. Shaw,
John A. Farquhar, and S. Michael Lutz, Logistics Management
Institute, Washington, DC, September 1978.
21. "Recommendations for PIES Access," Logistics Management Institute,
Washington, DC, March 1978.
22. Hearings before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, "The
Energy Information Act of 1976," U.S. Senate, March 3 and 8, 1976.
23. Hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, "Extension
of the Federal Energy Administration, U.S. Senate, April 1976.
24. Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, "Reappraisal of
Project Independence," U.S. Congress, March 1975.
25. Hearings before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
"Energy Information Act of 1974," U.S. Senate, 1974.
26. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight Procedures, Committee
on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, May 3, 1976.
27. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee, "Energy Conservation and Oil Policy,"
U.S. House of Representatives, March 1975.
28. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Washington, DC, 1976.
29. Energy Planning and Policy, Thomas H. Teitenberg, Lexington Books,
D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, MA, 1976.
30. "Department of Energy Organization Act," Committee on Government
Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, Report 95-346, Part 1,
May 16, 1977.
31. "Department of Energy Organization Act," Committee of Conference,
U.S. House of Representatives, Report 95-539, July 26, 1977.
32. "Department of Energy Organization Act," Committee on Governmental
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Report 95-164, May 14, 1977.
29
33. "Federal Energy Administration Authorization and Extension,"
Committee of Conference, U.S. House of Representatives, Report
94-1392, August 4, 1976.
34. "Federal Energy Administraton Authorization and Extension,"
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. House of
Representatives, Report 94-1113, May 10, 1976.
35. "Federal Energy Administration Extension Act," Committee on
Government Operations, U.S. Senate, Report 94-874, May 13, 1976.
36. An Antitrust Primer, Earl W. Kintner, 2nd Edition, The MacMillan
Co., New York, 1973.
37. "Open for Business Only? A Common Cause Study of the Department of
Energy," Common Cause, Washington, DC, 1979.
38. "A Review of the Project Independence Report," Submitted to the
Office of Energy Research and Development Policy, National Science
Foundation, Battelle Columbus Laboratories, Jan. 10, 1975.
39. "Department of Energy Organization Act," Hearings before the
Committee on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, March and April 1976.
40. "Activities of the Energy Information Administration," Report to the
President and the Congress, Professional Audit Review Team,
Washington, DC, May 7, 1979.
41. Annual Report to Congress 1978, Energy Information Administration,
DOE/EIA-0173/1, Volume 1, Washington, DC.
42. Statement of Missions and Functions, Energy Information
Administration, Office of Energy Information Validation, April 1978.
